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7 Abstract A Darwinian theory of the evolution of lan-
8 guage must be incremental: to explain the transition from a
9 hominin baseline with great ape grade communicative
10 capacities to language-equipped hominins as a series of
11 small steps. This paper takes up that project for the special
12 case of words, giving an incremental model of the call to
13 word transition. The model is embedded in a general
14 conception of human social evolution with independent
15 empirical support, but it also depends on some more spe-
16 ciﬁc assumptions about language and about the earlier
17 forms of hominin communication. Given these assump-
18 tions, the paper can be no more than a working draft of a
19 more complete theory.20
21 Keywords Evolution of language  Evolution of
22 reference  Evolution of the lexicon  Evolution of human
23 social behaviour
24 1 Deacon’s Challenge
25 In developing a plausible theory of language evolution, one
26 challenge is that of developing an incremental model of
27 change; one that takes us by small improvements from the
28 baseline communicative and cognitive capacities of great
29 apes to those contemporary humans. We need a lineage
30 explanation of the evolution of language (Calcott 2008).
31 This problem has been canvassed most famously with
32 respect to syntax, with many of those inﬂuenced by
33 Chomsky arguing that there is no plausible incremental
34model of the transition from protolanguage-like commu-
35nication systems to full human language (Berwick et al.
362013; Miyagawa et al. 2013). This challenge is clearly
37signiﬁcant, for syntax, and the productivity it brings, is
38clearly one fundamental difference between human lan-
39guage and animal call systems (Hauser et al. 2002). But
40this paper focuses on a different challenge: explaining the
41evolution of the lexicon. For animal calls are very different
42indeed from referential terms, and it is not obvious how
43there could be an incremental transition from calls to
44words. Terry Deacon identiﬁed this issue in his (Deacon
451997). In explaining why there are no simple languages, he
46showed that animal signals, because they are about the here
47and the now, could be acquired through associative learn-
48ing. That is not true of words. Names, for example, are not
49routinely used in the presence of their bearer, so a naive
50subject could not learn to associate a distinctive sound with
51the presence of a particular individual.
52This paper aims to explain how referential terms
53emerged from animal calls. In developing this sketch (it is
54no more), I shall make ﬁve framing assumptions. The ﬁrst
55is a background assumption about the mechanisms
56involved in the evolution of language. The second locates
57the evolution of language in an overall conception of the
58evolution of hominin social behaviour. The third, fourth
59and ﬁfth are speciﬁc to language: a gesture-ﬁrst view of the
60initial expansion of hominin communicative capacities; a
61speciﬁcation of some of the cognitive competences
62required for the use of referential vocabulary; and ﬁnally, I
63assume that ‘‘protolanguage’’ is an important intermediate
64stage in the evolution of language. Let me elaborate.
65First, I shall assume that language evolved by some
66version of cultural inheritance and cultural evolution. It is
67uncontroversial that the storehouses of speciﬁc signals in
68language-like systems are built by individual innovation, as
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69 new signs are coined and catch on, and are then transmitted
70 by social learning to the next generation. That is true now,
71 and I assume it was true as human communicative capacities
72 began to expand. Of course, once a learned capacity has
73 become central to the lifeway of a group, the selective
74 environment changes, and selection favours genetic changes
75 that made the acquisition of those learned communicative
76 tools more reliable or less costly. These changes might in
77 turn enhance the capacity for the further cultural elaboration
78 and transmission of the emerging system (Avital and Jab-
79 lonka 2000; West-Eberhard 2003; Deacon 2003; Zollman
80 and Smead 2010). Given the impact we would expect even
81 rudimentary versions of language to have on the social
82 environment, and hence the selective environment, very
83 likely, language is a product of coevolution between cultural
84 learning and genetic response.
1 But while gene-culture
85 coevolution probably played an important role in the
86 emergence of language, cultural innovation comes before
87 adapting genetic change. There will be selection for genes
88 with speciﬁc positive effects on an agent’s capacity to learn
89 and use a communication system only once that system is an
90 established and important feature of the local environment.
91 Second, the speciﬁc suggestions about language evolu-
92 tion is nested within an overall conception of the evolution
93 of human social life. Communication is one form of
94 cooperation, and the evolution of human social life is
95 characterised by the expanding role of cooperation. But
96 that expansion was not seamless. In my view, there were
97 two cooperation revolutions in ancient hominin life: one
98 that took our lineage from great ape levels of cooperation
99 to cooperating, coordinating forager bands, specialising in
100 team-based hunting of large game. The life of mutualist
101 foragers, I have argued, transitioned to reciprocation-based,
102 small party foraging around 100k years ago (Sterelny
103 2014). This second economic and social transformation had
104 profound consequences for the communicative needs of
105 human foragers. In summary, then, humans evolved as
106 social, increasingly cooperative, technique-and-technology
107 enhanced foragers over several million years. But the tar-
108 gets, the social organisation, and the technical bases of
109 foraging changed profoundly over that period. As tech-
110 nique and target changed, so too did the economic basis of
111 cooperation, and so too did its communicative demands.
112 Third, I have argued elsewhere, and will assume here,
113 that the expansion of communicative capacities in the
114 hominin lineage began with an expanded role for gesture
115 (Tomasello 2008; Corballis 2011; Sterelny 2012). Great
116apes have little voluntary control over their vocalisation,
117and their vocal repertoires are largely insensitive to indi-
118vidual experience. Their use of gesture is much more
119ﬂexible, and partly for that reason, it is much more likely
120that hominin communicative skills ﬁrst improved with an
121expansion of gesture.
122Fourth, an incremental model of the journey of language
123evolution is sensitive to one’s picture of its destination; to
124one’s view of the nature of language as it is now used. Thus I
125cannot be neutral about meaning and reference. These are
126deeply controversial issues in philosophy of language. There
127is an important line of thought (associated especiallywith the
128work of Donald Davidson) arguing that sentence meaning is
129the explanatorily fundamental concept in semantics. I remain
130unconvinced, in part because on that view it is difﬁcult to
131explain the incremental emergence of language both in
132individual ontogeny and lineage evolution. There is an
133associated research tradition that sees the formal sciences
134rather than the natural sciences as the proper home of
135semantic theory. On this view, the explanatory relationship
136between a theory of meaning and actual human communi-
137cation is indirect, akin to the light a formal model of rational
138choice sheds on human mating behaviour. (Lewis 1975) is a
139paradigm of this line of thought.
140On these matters there is no consensus. But I shall
141develop my analysis around one important mainstream
142view, ‘causal descriptivism’; for a clean and elegant version,
143see (Jackson 2010). Causal descriptivism recognises the
144social dimension of meaning and reference. For example, I
145can talk about Feynman and about hadrosaurs, despite my
146never having met Feynman or handled a hadrosaur fossil,
147because I am part of a speech community, part of a network,
148and so my uses of ‘‘Feynman’’ and ‘‘hadrosaur’’ are causally
149linked to those who know (or knew) the man and to those
150who know the fossils. There is a ‘‘division of linguistic
151labour’’ (Putnam 1975), and that allows my uses of ‘‘Fe-
152ynman’’ to depend on others; on information-preserving
153causal chains, in which each link in the chain is a sentence
154token containing ‘‘Feynman’’ and carrying information
155about Feynman. The whole network leads back to Feynman
156and to the use of the name in his presence. The great
157expressive richness of language depends in part on this
158division of linguistic labour.
159Causal descriptivism also recognises the cognitive
160sophistication of uses of a name. For users of referential
161terms are aware of the causal networks that support their
162semantic competence, and that awareness is part of their
163referential competence. Our capacity to use names to index
164information about spatiotemporally distant places and
165things—as long-range demonstratives—depends not just
166on the existence of these linguistic-cum-causal chains that
167link our use of a name to its referent, but to our recognition
168of the existence of such chains, and on our intention to use a
1FL01 1 Our capacity to speak depends obviously depends on genetically-
1FL02 supported structural features of the mouth, tongue and larynx,
1FL03 together with very elaborate mechanisms of control (Fitch 2010).
1FL04 But it is not obvious that adaptations for vocal control evolved for
1FL05 language. Music is another possibility (Mithen 2009); so too are much
1FL06 simpler precursors to language.
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169 name in a further extension of the network. So to continue
170 with the example, mere causal continuity in using ‘‘Feyn-
171 man’’ does not preserve the link back to Feynman. Suppose
172 I decide that Feynman is a ﬁne name for the possum that
173 lives in the tree next to my veranda, and then go on to
174 remark that Feynman has an outrageously cute nose and
175 bushy tail. That token of ‘‘Feynman’’ depends on the net-
176 work leading back to the physicist, but the remark is about
177 the possum. My socially mediated capacity to exploit the
178 network to refer back to Feynman depends not just on the
179 existence of the growing network and the connection of a
180 token to that network, but on each individual’s under-
181 standing that they are using that name as part of that net-
182 work. While it is hard to specify exactly what users
183 understand about their language in using it, and, certainly,
184 they have nothing like an explicit commitment to any
185 semantic theory, referential competence is not reﬂexlike, or
186 completely isolated from reﬂective understanding. In con-
187 trast to animals and their signal systems, our capacity to use
188 terms to refer to things depends on agents recognising, in a
189 rough and ready way, causal transmission chains and their
190 role.
191 The expressive richness of language in part depends on
192 the division of linguistic labour, but I shall suggest that it
193 also in part depends on the fact that agents know, in this
194 rough and ready way, how their referential terms connect
195 to the world. I suspect that our reﬂective understanding of
196 language gives it a ﬂexibility that it would not otherwise
197 have. Such ﬂexibility is manifest in a marginal way in my
198 creating a nickname for a possum, but it is fundamental to
199 one distinctive and important feature of language. We can
200 routinely expand its expressive powers by coining new
201 lexical items. Ray Jackendoff has pointed out that our
202 indeﬁnitely and readily expandable lexicon is one of the
203 great divides between human language and animal com-
204 munication systems (Jackendoff 1999). This capacity to
205 freely innovate is semantic rather than morphological or
206 phonological. We cannot add new phonemes or make
207 syntactic innovations at will. So this paper explores the
208 potential connections between our expandable lexicon and
209 our rough-and-ready folk semantics,
210 Finally, I agree with those theorists who take ‘‘proto-
211 language’’ to be a critical intermediate between vervet-like
212 systems and full language. Our picture of protolanguage
213 comes from pidgins, trading lingua franca, and similar
214 limited human communication systems that arise when
215 people are thrown together over substantial periods and
216 must communicate, but have no common language (Lie-
217 berman 1998; Jackendoff 1999; Bickerton 2002, 2005,
218 2009). These pidgin-like systems typically have quite
219 extensive vocabularies, but have little or no grammatical or
220 morphological structure, and word order is often quite
221 variable. They are face to face communication systems,
222typically somewhat restricted in their expressive power,
223with mutual understanding depending heavily on context.
224The main focus of this paper will be on intermediates
225between animal call systems and protolanguage; not on
226how protolanguage became language (on this, see Sterelny
227under review). Partly for this reason, syntax and its evo-
228lution is not central to this paper; syntax is critical to the
229protolanguage to language transition.
230The path ahead is as follows. I ﬁrst sharpen the contrasts
231between referential terms and animal signalling systems
232via a brief review of Skryrm’s work on the evolution of
233signals and of the famous vervet predator call system. In
234these next two sections I also begin to explore some
235intermediaries between reﬂexlike animal calls and more
236reﬂectively understood human words. The project in these
237sections is to explore some plausible intermediates between
238calls and words, and discuss the interaction between
239reﬂective understanding and the expressive power and
240ﬂexibility of language. Section 4 and 5 ties this discussion
241to the general model of the evolution of human social
242behaviour, identifying the connections between the
243demands on communication and of an increasingly com-
244plex foraging economy. I close with table identifying a
245candidate pathway from calls to words, but this is intended
246as no more than a working hypothesis. Let’s begin with
247referential signals and primate calls.
2482 The Limits of Speaking Vervetese
249Causal descriptivism implicitly draws a contrast between
250the semantics of a language and its organisational features.
251Users are sensitive to the phonology, morphology and
252syntax of their language. But in contrast to the mechanisms
253of reference, our responses to differences in sounds or
254structure are reﬂexlike. For example, we recognise differ-
255ences in accent and register, but our linguistic diagnoses of
256those differences are often horribly inaccurate.
2 We stand
257to phonology as animals stand to their whole communi-
258cation system: animal signalling system do not depend on
259user understanding. For them, meaning is as reﬂexlike as
260phonology. A young chimp that exposes her armpit to her
261carer with a playful expression is asking to be tickled.
262Almost certainly, she has no clue about the reinforcing
263interactions that have shaped that gesture, ritualised it and
264have given it its function.
3
2FL012 There is a well-known phenomenon in sociolinguistics known as
2FL02low middle class hyper-correction; failed lower middle class attempts
2FL03to identify and adopt high prestige speech patterns (as in Barry
2FL04Humphries’ ‘‘Excuse I’’).
3FL013 Such gestures are not innate, and show some variation from group
3FL02to group (Whiten et al. 1999), though the ‘‘play face’’ signal of playful
3FL03intent is innate.
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265 The view that signals can be meaningful without the
266 user awareness is reinforced by recent work of Brian
267 Skyrms. One of the main themes of Brian Skyrms’ Signals
268 is to show that signalling does not depend on capacities
269 possessed only by cognitively sophisticated agents. A sig-
270 nalling equilibrium can emerge and stabilise without the
271 agents in question having any reﬂective understanding of
272 their activities or how they contribute to that equilibrium
273 (Skyrms 2010). Signals, on the Lewis-Skyrms model,
274 depend on asymmetries between signaller and receiver; one
275 has access to information that the other lacks; one has
276 capacities to intervene that the other lacks. Signals depend
277 on commonalities too: on an overlap of interests between
278 the agents. With these structural features in play, Skyrms
279 shows both that simple forms of adaptive evolution and
280 simple forms of associative learning sufﬁce to take agents
281 to a signalling equilibrium. The basic model is unrealistic,
282 but when we relax simplifying assumptions about common
283 interest, and about one/one mappings between potential
284 signals and relevant states of the world, complete or partial
285 signalling equilibria still emerge. Skyrms thus shows that
286 communication can be part of the environmental context in
287 which intelligence evolved, rather than a capacity which
288 depends on the prior existence of intelligent agents, as it
289 does in the original Lewis signalling game (for further
290 discussion of these ideas and their importance, see (God-
291 frey-Smith 2011, forthcoming).
292 Despite the simplicity of these models, Skyrms suggests
293 that the famous vervetese warning call system is a fairly
294 close approximation in nature to a Lewis-Skyrms signal-
295 ling equilibrium (p23).
297
2989
300 Sender Receiver1
302 Eagle ) cough Cough ) run under bush
303 Leopard ) bark Bark ) run up tree
304 Snake ) chutter Chutter ) scan and move
305
306
307
308 The vervet call system is not quite a Lewis-Skyrms
309 signalling system, for the sender’s payoff for signalling
310 does not depend on the receiver’s escape behaviour (as it
311 would, if the sender was an infant riding on her mother’s
312 back), but it is a good enough match to ﬁx ideas, and for
313 me to explore some contrasts between signalling systems
314 and referential systems. These contrasts are signiﬁcant,
315 even though vervet calls are responses to, and carry
316 information about, the external environment.
4 Signals are
317 neither words nor sentences. They do not have the orga-
318 nisation or functional speciﬁcity of sentences (they are
319 neither indicative nor imperative); they do not have the
320stimulus independence of words. Consider, in particular,
321the following differences.
322Vervet calls are pushmi-pullyu representations. They
323both indicate a salient feature of the environment, and
324direct a speciﬁc course of action (Millikan 1989,
3252005). The eagle-cough does not lead the receiver to
326update an enduring model of the environment in ways
327that inﬂuence a range of decisions; its effect is both
328transient and speciﬁc.
329Vervet calls are unstructured: no element of the
330cough call maps onto a speciﬁc component of the
331response.
332Vervet calls are stimulus-bound: both the informative
333and the instructive content of the calls are about the
334here and now.
5
335As just noted, the emergence of informative signalling, and
336of adaptive response to informative signals, does not
337depend on either agent recognising their activities as
338signals or as responses to signals. The entire recognition-
339signal-reception-action loop can be reﬂexlike. Language is
340structured; it is not stimulus bound; it has devices which
341distinguish imperative from indicative content. So how do
342we get from a vervet-like communication system to a
343system beginning to resemble human language, and what
344role does an agent’s own understanding of their commu-
345nicative tools play in this process? We need a picture of
346how very early hominins might have begun communicating
347in ways richer and more ﬂexible than vervetese, but not yet
348with protolanguage.
349Part of the solution is to identify the central role was
350played by the expansion of gesture and mime (Sterelny
3512012). First: on a gesture-ﬁrst view, explaining the emer-
352gence of a structured system is much less challenging, for
353even simple gesture sequences are structured. If I point in
354the direction of a tree, and ﬂap my arms, one element of the
355sequence indicates direction, the other, the target. More-
356over, once we note that communicative demands were
357increasing as human technical skills improved, we can
358begin to explain the emergence of stimulus-independent
359signals. By the Middle Pleistocene, perhaps even by the
360early Pleistocene, human artefact production depended on
361the internal representation and internal control of complex,
362tightly integrated, and rather error-intolerant sequences of
363actions (Stout 2002, 2010; Stout and Chaminade 2012). In
364the ﬁrst instance, these internally initiated and controlled
4FL01 4 Many animal calls are probably best interpreted as expressions of
4FL02 motivational and emotional states (Maynard Smith and Harper 2003).
5FL015 This stimulus bound character of signalling is not intrinsic to
5FL02Lewis-Skyrms models. In principle, the sender’s signal could specify
5FL03some distant or future event. The response, likewise, could delayed in
5FL04time and displaced in space from the signalling context. But in such
5FL05cases, it is hard to see how a Lewis-Skyrms signalling equilibrium
5FL06could emerge by associative learning. Association depends on
5FL07immediacy.
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365 action systems had resource-acquisition upshots; they
366 produced tools rather than communicative displays. How-
367 ever, since their execution was under control of an internal
368 template, not an external stimulus, the sequences could be
369 initiated in the absence of their normal material substrate
370 (and sometimes might have been, in vacuum practice or
371 demonstration). Moreover, these skills were transmitted
372 through social learning (Hiscock 2013). Selection for
373 enhanced social learning makes the details of what others
374 were doing with their hands and bodies salient. Given the
375 cognitive mechanisms already in place, those early humans
376 would have only needed relatively modest theory of mind
377 capacities and communicative intent, to turn functional
378 action sequences under the control of inner templates into
379 structured, stimulus independent signals. An ochre-grind-
380 ing sequence becomes a mime of grinding ochre, in the
381 absence of ochre, and thus a suggested course of action.
382 There was selection pressure to redeploy these cognitive
383 capacities for communicative ends. As Michael Tomasello
384 in particular has argued, Middle Pleistocene hominins were
385 coming to rely on collaborative foraging for the essentials
386 of life, and collaboration required coordination (Tomasello
387 2008; Tomasello et al. 2012).
388 Middle Pleistocene hominins—erectines—were more
389 cooperative, more meat-dependent, more technically skil-
390 led, and had larger brains than great apes. Their gestural
391 communication, I suggest, would have been richer too,
392 with indicative pointing, gestures in the exchange of food
393 and favours and perhaps as an aid to cooperation and
394 coordination in the here-and-now. I suggest then that the
395 initial step beyond these richer but still in-the-moment
396 systems to a protolanguage was by a further expansion of
397 gesture-mime communication. In making this suggestion,
398 let me emphasize the limits on structured, regularly used,
399 conventionalised gesture-mime systems. Its initial emer-
400 gence would require a relatively small, and hence theo-
401 retically plausible, step beyond known great ape capacities.
402 As gesture-mime sequences are structured by default, the
403 picture offers a plausible model of the emergence of a
404 gestural form of protoword for activities and for a quite
405 limited range of artefacts, biological kinds and resources.
406 The step is plausible, because the uptake of these new
407 signals depends on some combination of iconicity and
408 associative connection. While that explains how the system
409 can establish in agents who have not yet evolved speciﬁc
410 cognitive capacities to enhance their capacities to use a
411 protolanguage, it also sharply restricts the system’s
412 potential expressive range. The only kinds (as distinct from
413 activities) that can be reliably represented are those that are
414 the target of a distinctive and recognisable kind of activity,
415 or those that can themselves be mimicked (in appearance,
416 motion or sound). Perhaps an inspired or fortunate agent
417 could luck onto a way of representing, say, a gazelle,
418perhaps by imitating its stotting jumps. But the iconic basis
419of the system constrains its expressive power.
420Ethnographically described foragers have very extensive
421folk ﬂoras and faunas (for a recent example, see Saslis-
422Lagoudakis et al. 2014), very little of which could be
423readily represented by redeploying a typical resource-
424generating response to the presence of these kinds as a
425representation of the kind itself. Many species in folk
426taxonomies have no utilitarian signiﬁcance; many others
427have no distinctive signiﬁcance. Likewise, there is no
428obvious way of representing speciﬁc places or speciﬁc
429individuals (again, except perhaps when individuals have a
430distinctive gait or physical tic). Of course, sign languages
431can have all the expressive power of a vocal language, but
432to do so, sign languages must move far beyond re-using
433action sequences that are available and salient for non-
434communicative reasons, and beyond iconicity. An expan-
435ded form of gesture helps us understand how a richer
436communicative system could evolve from those used by
437great apes. But even if we suppose a social world in which
438these complex gestural sequences are used so regularly that
439they have become a routine part of social life, the
440expressive powers of the system will be quite sharply
441limited.
4423 Innovation, Selective Retention, and Language
443Evolution
444One of the framing assumptions of this paper is that lan-
445guage evolved through cultural evolution, probably
446including very extensive gene-culture coevolution. But
447there are many ways of picturing cultural evolution, and
448one important point of current debate is on the relative
449importance of ‘‘blind’’ imitation compared to informed,
450discriminating use of models by those learning from them.
6
451On one view, social learning (especially high ﬁdelity social
452learning) depends on unreﬂective, perhaps even fully
453unconscious, imitation by a mimic of the model. On this
454view, imitation learning is low-cost, as the mimic does not
455pay the error costs of trial and error learning. But it is not
456cognitively sophisticated, as it does not presuppose that
457imitation learning depends on the agent understanding or
458reﬂecting on what he or she is learning; it just depends on
459being able to match actions to those of the model. Con-
460formist learning, where agents just match their behaviour to
461the most common pattern in their social world, is an
462important instance of this kind of unguided imitation. So
463too is unconscious imitation, where agents pick up and
6FL016 Though both these conceptions should be treated as the two ends of
6FL02a continuum, with many intermediate possibilities (Dennett 2005;
6FL03Sperber 2006; Boyd et al. 2011, 2013; Claidiere et al. 2014).
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464 match the social cues of their interlocutors (including their
465 gestural patterns) without noticing that they are doing so
466 (Heyes 2011). Likewise, agents ‘‘over-imitate’’; that is,
467 they continue to use a precise action sequence they have
468 copied from a model, even when there is information
469 showing that some elements in the sequence play no causal
470 role in producing the desired outcomes (Nielsen and
471 Tomaselli 2010; McGuigan et al. 2011). This phenomenon
472 is often cited as evidence that social learning is quite often
473 blind (Boyd et al. 2013).
474 When social learning is unreﬂective copying, adaptive
475 ﬁt is explained by the population-level process of differ-
476 ential success and selective retention of naturally occurring
477 variation. There is no assumption that individual agents
478 have a reﬂective understanding of the basis of the ﬁt
479 between action and world. The best real world examples
480 are probably food customs and taboos; it turns out that
481 there is a range of cases where taboos seem to guide
482 adaptive behaviour: for example, there is a Fijian food
483 taboo that forbids pregnant women from eating certain ﬁsh
484 which do, as a matter of fact, pose special risks to such
485 agents. But there is no evidence that the taboo is respected
486 because Fijian women understand these risks. So we have
487 here a plausible example of selection shaping blind con-
488 formity to produce an adaptive ﬁt between response and
489 environment.
7
490 However, social learning is sometimes a species of
491 intelligent learning. Agents do indeed learn from other
492 agents, and in a class of important cases, their behavioural
493 proﬁle comes to match those from whom they have
494 learning. But they bring to the learning situation both rel-
495 evant pre-existing information (so the social stimulus is in
496 part just a trigger) and advanced capacities for efﬁcient
497 means-ends reasoning. Even in these cases, population-
498 level mechanisms can still play an important role in
499 explaining adaptive ﬁt between action and environmental
500 demands (Powell et al. 2009), but so too does the agent’s
501 own understanding of the situation. Many real cases of
502 cultural evolution are probably hybrids (Boyd et al. 2013).
503 I suspect that many technical innovations began with
504 material doodling—aimless tinkering—or accidents.
505 Likely examples include discovering that exposing ﬂints to
506 ﬁre makes them easier to work, or that exposing the
507 sharpened tips of wooden spears to heat hardens them. But
508 intelligent understanding was important in exploiting those
509 fortunate accidents, in recognising consequence and
510 opportunity. Modelling work in cultural evolution is, then,
511 compatible both with the idea that innovation and retention
512 depends on some form of local insight into fortunate
513consequences,
8 but this work is also compatible with the
514idea that cultural adaptations evolved incrementally and
515adaptively by population level processes that amplify the
516frequency of practices that happen to be successful, inde-
517pendently of whether agents notice success.
518To us, imaginatively projecting ourselves into the
519communicative dilemmas of mid-Pleistocene hominins,
520and ourselves armed with theory of mind and with our rich
521communicative experience, it is natural for us to suppose
522that communication systems evolved culturally, but by
523intelligent innovation and uptake at the micro-level. The
524agent wants to communicate something to his/her social
525partners beyond their immediate perceptual horizon, and
526hopes that carrying out an activity typically performed for
527real beyond the perception horizon will induce the desired
528response. The ﬁrst steps in gestural protolanguage depend
529on agents representing to themselves their communicative
530dilemmas; thinking of and trying out candidate solutions;
531in fortunate cases, audiences recognise solutions as solu-
532tions, thus beginning to establish an expanded communi-
533cative practice; (Tomasello 2014) thinks of gestural
534communication as expanding in this intelligent way.
535However, communicative innovation need not have
536begun with such intelligence. Indeed, Skyrms’ ideas can be
537seen as suggesting that communication systems evolve via
538these relatively blind processes; by undirected, unreﬂective
539trial and error. For he certainly shows that signalling
540equilibria can evolve both through simple learning and
541through the natural selection of undirected variation.
542However, these signalling equilibria emerge only for very
543simple systems: with two player interactions; with a small
544repertoire of potential signals; with nature able to ‘‘choose’’
545only from a small set of environmental variants; and with
546agents able to choose from a small set of potential
547responses to candidate signals. These choices are required
548for model tractability, but they dramatically reduce the
549search space, improving the prospects that a blind trial will
550elicit a reinforcing response from the world. These sim-
551plifying assumptions make me reluctant to rely heavily on
552these modelling results, but even without relying on these
553models, there is some scope for blind processes in the
554evolution of language. Cues can turn into signals without
555anyone noticing the process. An infant lifts her arms to be
556picked up, and as that habit is repeated it becomes a signal
557of the desire for contact, and the signal becomes conven-
558tionalised by a quite automatic and unreﬂective process.
559Initial stages of planned activities are potential cues, and
560these too might be recruited and ritualised as signals.
561Likewise, practice—say, an adolescent practicing spear-
562throwing at a target—might trigger the desire to actually
7FL01 7 See (Henrich and Henrich 2010), and also the work of Marvin
7FL02 Harris, who systematically explains food taboos and customs this
7FL03 way, though without an explicit evolutionary model (Harris 1985).
8FL018 As in models of cultural transmission which assume agents copy the
8FL02most successful of the practices to which they are exposed.
K. Sterelny
123
Journal : Large 11245 Dispatch : 18-10-2014 Pages : 12
Article No. : 9284
h LE h TYPESET
MS Code : TOPO-D-14-00085 h CP h DISK4 4
A
u
th
o
r
 P
r
o
o
f
U
N
C
O
R
R
E
C
T
E
D
P
R
O
O
F
563 hunt, both in an audience and in the agent himself, by some
564 contagion-like process, and thus becomes reinforced as a
565 signal to hunt, without reﬂective understanding being
566 essential to the process. For there will be associative con-
567 nections, both for the agent and for others, between ste-
568 reotypical hunting activity patterns, memories of actually
569 hunting, and the emotions and satisfactions that often
570 accompany hunting. This will be true of other core utili-
571 tarian practices too, so for them too there is an associative
572 path to initial recruitment as a signal.
573 However, as we saw in Sect. 2, iconicity and association
574 have a limited domain of potential signals. Once the basic
575 ﬂow of communication depends on arbitrary signals, it is
576 harder to see the expressive powers of a community’s
577 communicative practices expanding by happy accident in
578 innovation and response. Once gesture is no longer pre-
579 dominantly iconic, or replaced by arbitrary vocal signals,
580 intention and interpretation seem to be essential.
9 Signal
581 uptake can no longer be mediated by associative links
582 between the signal and the action (or actor) the signal
583 labels. Once the mime-gesture system has begun to expand,
584 and the menu of signals expands beyond those with asso-
585 ciative links to functional, non-communicative actions, the
586 uptake and spread of innovation in expressive power will
587 depend mostly on intelligent innovation and response. For
588 matching and repeating a communicative innovation is
589 rarely the critical response that reinforces and stabilises its
590 initial uses, and which leads to others adopting the inno-
591 vation. The sign sequence must be successfully exploited
592 by the audience, typically to allow the innovator and the
593 audience to coordinate in action. In the next sections, I tie
594 these remarks on the cognitive challenge of communicative
595 innovation to the changing social environment of our
596 hominin ancestors.
597 4 Heidelbergensian Conversations: Coordinating
598 Mutualist Foraging
599 Consider our hominin ancestors, then, as their foraging
600 became less dependent on opportunistic encounter, and
601 more dependent on organised search, planned ambush, and
602 targeted large game hunting. Dating the transition from
603 scavenging and opportunistic foraging to targeted large
604 game hunting—with the coordination, planning, coopera-
605 tion and local knowledge implied by that lifeway—is
606 contentious. It may well have been widely distributed in
607 space and time, with no single time and place of origin, and
608with many false starts.
10 But many researchers see this
609transition as occurring somewhere between 1,000 and
610500 kya perhaps with the Hiedelbergensians (Stiner 2002;
611Foley and Gamble 2009). These hominins are often iden-
612tiﬁed as the common ancestor of sapiens and Neanderthals.
613These were very large brained hominin that evolved per-
614haps around 800 kya (Stringer 2012). By 500 kya, those
615human foragers were very large brained, and technically
616adept: they were in control of ﬁre; their stone tools were
617made with very considerable expertise. They may have
618been developing composite tools (Barham 2013). It is
619likely that they had a range of soft materials technologies
620as well; well-made, well-balanced wooden spears survive
621from about 400 kya. They were successful large game
622hunters.
623I have argued elsewhere that these foragers depended on
624teamwork, not just mobwork (Sterelny 2014), for their
625foraging economy was based on large game hunting with
626short-ranged weapons, and for such an enterprise to be
627regularly successful in delivering resources at tolerable risk
628levels to the participants, these hunts very likely (1)
629depended on the mass ﬁrepower of the adult males of the
630band (perhaps supported by the women); (2) natural history
631expertise: both endurance hunting and ambush hunting
632depend on sophisticated knowledge of targets and terrain;
633(3) some collective planning and decision making, espe-
634cially if ambush hunting is important. A band cannot just
635wander through its territory in the hope of a fortunate
636encounter, and ambush hunting depends on a division of
637labour, with some hunters beating and driving potential
638prey into ambush sites. (4) coordination at the point of
639contact. This foraging strategy implies reasonably sophis-
640ticated theory of mind skills: these foragers needed to know
641what each other wanted and intended.
642Impressive though these ancient foragers were, there
643remained quite important differences between these half a
644million years gone foragers and sapiens foragers of the
645later Pleistocene. These older humans (1) show no signs of
646lives organised around ritual or religious belief; (2) they
647did not yet occupy the more challenging terrestrial habi-
648tats— the arid lands, the high latitudes; (3) they exploited a
649narrower range of resources; (4) their material culture was
650less rich. Given both their quite challenging foraging life-
651ways, but also their simpler social and economic lives,
652what were their communicative needs?
653As I see it, coordinated and organised hunting and for-
654aging required (1) coordinated cooperation, very likely
655with role differentiation; (2) planning routes, areas, and
656targets. I suggest something like the following scenario.
9FL01 9 Though once an innovation has become part of a local group’s
9FL02 repertoire, its use can become automatic and unreﬂective.
10FL0110 There is some evidence suggesting targeted hunting goes deep into
10FL02hominin history [perhaps 1.7 mya, and thus early in the Acheulian
10FL03technical tradition (Bunn 2007, 2012; Bunn and Pickering 2010)].
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657 The expansion of communication, in these cooperative
658 social environments, began with a restricted repertoire of
659 mimes, probably supplemented with gesture to indicate
660 speciﬁc agents and directions. The repertoire initially
661 consisted of routinized, abbreviated, perhaps even con-
662 ventionalised renditions of action sequences that were
663 already part of most agents’ repertoires. The mimes are
664 signalling versions of established patterns of functional
665 behaviour; patterns that were mutually recognised, and
666 emotionally and motivationally salient. I suggest that this
667 repertoire was used to suggest and negotiate future activi-
668 ties: selection of targets; routes and places (perhaps just
669 indicated by supplementary gesture); agreeing roles.
11
670 These negotiations were face to face, with rich common
671 knowledge, and about the more or less immediate future. It
672 probably involving choices amongst a quite restricted
673 range of options, as these were not yet broad spectrum
674 foragers, exploiting most of the local resources. In face to
675 face interaction, speciﬁc individuals can picked one
676 another out by pointing, through demonstratives or deictic
677 pronouns. Heidelbergensians, then, might not have needed
678 anything like proper names; they did not have a pressing
679 need to communicate about absent agents. Given rich
680 common knowledge, fairly short time horizons, and the
681 narrow option pool, quite limited communication tools
682 would enable these agents to settle in advance: What shall
683 we go after? Where shall we go? Who does what? This
684 scenario envisages communicative and theory of mind
685 capacities in advance of any living great apes, but not a
686 saltationist leap from great ape capacities.
687 If this is right, the core ecological transition from
688 opportunistic social foraging to planned and coordinated
689 social foraging could be supported with a relatively modest
690 upgrade in great ape communicative capacity. Even so,
691 there would be signiﬁcant pressure to further expand
692 communicative capacity. In particular, there would have
693 been signiﬁcant pressure to improve the reliability and
694 reduce the cost of social learning. Peter Hiscock has
695 pointed out that learning stone tool making by trial-and-
696 error learning, even when trial-and-error is supported by
697 observing the process and products of others’ operations, is
698 difﬁcult and expensive. It has high risk costs, as errors do
699 not just waste raw material, they send sharp shards ﬂying
700 fast and in unpredictable directions. Given the high costs of
701 learning and the low cost of help, we would expect
702 selection for active teaching (Thornton and Raihani 2008;
703 Hiscock 2013). Moreover, the shift to bully scavenging and
704targeted hunting transformed the hominin position in the
705food web; we became top carnivores. As a consequence,
706our ancestors had to learn to navigate through very much
707larger territories than those of chimpanzees (Layton et al.
7082012). But foragers do not just navigate through these
709larger territories. Ethnolinguisticlly known foragers
710develop very rich local ﬂora and faunas. In some cases,
711foragers are able to recognise thousands of species (Berlin
7121992). No individual invents such a ﬂora herself. These
713develop across multiple generations, and as these systems
714of local natural history information became larger and
715more accurate, this depended increasingly on high volume,
716high ﬁdelity information ﬂowing between generations. In
717this process, surely labels help (Csibra and Gergely 2011).
718Labels make small differences between similar species
719salient, and they serve as memory tags. So while the core
720foraging adaptation probably depended on a relatively
721modest advance in communicative capacity, this load on
722social learning selected for further expansion of commu-
723nicative capacity.
724The gesture-mine system I have sketched can expand in
725three natural ways. (1) Most simply, as ﬁrst order skills
726expand, so too will the communicative repertoire. As and
727to the extent that a forager group’s ecological and technical
728capacities expand, the capacity to communicate about the
729new skills should expand too. (2) The mime of a complex,
730multi-part activity has a natural structure, with a stage of
731the mime mapping onto a stage of the activity (though as
732noted above, I would expect that once a mime for an
733activity comes into common use, it will be abbreviated and
734schematised). The structured character of a mime makes it
735possible to extract a stage of one mime, and combine it
736with another, to create a new routine (harvesting grain;
737grinding ochre, to grinding grain). The structured nature of
738mime makes recombination in principle possible. I suspect
739this possibility was exploited, if at all, only when mime-
740based communication was a routine and regular part of
741social life; once it was no longer communication at the
742very edge of what was possible to communicate. (3) Mimes
743can be used not just as representations of actions, but of the
744agents and targets of actions. However, as noted earlier, to
745the extent that the iconic character of this system is
746important to successful communication, there are sharp
747limits on this representational option. This shift is possible
748only when an agent’s mode is distinctive enough; only
749when a target is speciﬁc to a particular, identiﬁable kind of
750act.
751In the earlier stages of this process, there is still room for
752lucky accidents of innovation, and contagion-based, asso-
753ciative triggers of audience response. For the communi-
754cative repertoire closely mirrors the foraging and extraction
755repertoire, and the representational repertoire is still func-
756tioning essentially as visual, or audio-visual, cues and
11FL01 11 For example, if ambush hunting was an important technique, they
11FL02 would need to decide in advice not just the targets and the location of
11FL03 an ambush, but some agents would have to wait concealed while
11FL04 others drove the game towards the trap. Roles would need to be
11FL05 decided in advance too. However, much of this might be done through
11FL06 default patterns, so the communicative load might be quite light.
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757 triggers of pre-existing cognitive structures in the audience;
758 of structures those agents have acquired in direct engage-
759 ment with their environment. As the menu of signals
760 expands, as recombination of signal elements becomes
761 important, as signals become less iconic and more arbi-
762 trary, there is less and less scope for innovation by ﬂuke
763 and uptake by association. That said, there is no clear point
764 at which the acquisition and expansion of the communi-
765 cative repertoire transitions from one depending on asso-
766 ciative learning, accidental innovation and fortunate
767 reinforcement to a system for which depends on intelligent
768 innovation and uptake. But as the process proceeds, there is
769 selection on agents to develop some understanding of their
770 own communicative skills.
771 5 New Things to Do and Say: From Mutualism
772 to Reciprocation
773 So the core foraging strategy of mutualist foragers living
774 perhaps 600 kya depended only on modest communicative
775 skills, and ones which might have initially expanded from
776 in-the-moment gestural systems by relatively simple, Sky-
777 rms-style mechanisms. But if the foraging strategy is sup-
778 ported with active assistance in the acquisition of crucial
779 skills, and with increasingly high volume social learning
780 about the band’s biological and physical environment, those
781 foragers would hit the limits of iconic and quasi-iconic
782 representation. Within those limits, those agents will ﬁnd it
783 impossible to fully label their world. Since iconicity is a
784 matter of degree, the shift away from an iconic system can
785 be gradual. But a shift from iconic labels—an abbreviated,
786 stylised ‘‘stott’’ for gazelles—to arbitrary signs in turn
787 selects for a shift to verbal labels, and locally intelligent
788 tinkering with communicative tools. Verbal labels allow
789 agents to act and communicate at the same time, and they
790 ease the burden on multi-party interactions. Liz Irvine has
791 pointed out to me that gesture-sign interaction is difﬁcult
792 between three or more, for at least one party to the inter-
793 action is out of another’s line of sight. Moreover, visual
794 attention is a scarce resource, so combining visually-based
795 communication with directly economic activity will be
796 challenging, except for the most routine and habitual pro-
797 cedures (Irvine, personal communication).
798 On this picture, Heidelbergensian foragers evolved from a
799 very limited gestural system depending heavily on iconicity
800 and association towards a cut-down protolanguage-like
801 system, probably based increasingly on verbal signals, and
802 probably requiring intelligent tinkering to extend the reper-
803 toire. That shift would be driven by selection to expand their
804 menu of quasi-kind terms to map their environment: for its
805 plants, animals, physical and geographic features. These are
806 quasi-kind terms, since there is no division of cognitive
807labour or linguistic deference in these local groups. Their
808referential world was the immediate environment with its
809resources and its risks. Individually and collectively, they
810were richly informed about this environment. Their capacity
811to use quasi-referential terms was ﬁrst hand, grounded in
812their own recognitional capacities and in recognition of the
813signalling practices of others. Likewise, if they had names,
814they were names of individuals everyone would recognise.
815There are no reference-sustaining causal networks with ﬁrst-
816hand users at one end of the chain, and referential danglers at
817the other end.
818Between 500 and 100 kya (or perhaps a little later:
81980 kya) there was a technical, economic and social revolu-
820tion, one demanding upgraded language. These later Pleis-
821tocene foragers continued to live in a cooperative social
822world in which sharing played a central role, but the engine
823of cooperation was direct and indirect reciprocation. The
824projectile revolution, and (probably) the depletion of some
825of their favoured large game targets changed the balance
826between foraging as a single unit, and splitting into much
827smaller parties, often with different targets. These later
828sapiens foragers often lived inmore spatially and temporally
829extended ﬁssion–fusion units. Different resources deplete at
830different rates, so once foragers shift to broad spectrum
831foraging, there is a tendency to transition from residential
832mobility (where the whole bandmoves as a unit) to logistical
833mobility [where the demographic core of the band moves
834less often, but work teams harvesting speciﬁc resources
835ﬁssion of the from the band for days or weeks (Binford
8361980)]. Reciprocation-based cooperation was still proﬁt-
837able, but more cognitively and motivationally challenging,
838as agents need to monitor their obligations and rewards over
839more diverse resources and longer time frames.
840These cognitive and motivational changes had commu-
841nicative implications as well. I have discussed some of
842these elsewhere (Sterelny 2014, under review). I shall take
843up just one element of those implications here. The sta-
844bility of cooperation based on reciprocation depends on
845accurate information about other agents and their deeds. In
846spatio-temporally extended ﬁssion–fusion social environ-
847ments, accurate information about third parties requires
848gossip: agents passing on information (perhaps via inter-
849mediaries) about others and what they have done. By
850100 kya, information-preserving causal chains about spe-
851ciﬁc individuals played a central role in social life, because
852groups were more spatio-temporally dispersed and because
853tracking reputation really mattered. Social worlds were still
854small enough, and interconnected enough, for every user of
855a name to be able to identify their living bearers (con-
856temporary foragers still live this way: Hill 2012). However,
857these social worlds were now dispersed. Clive Gamble
858describes this period as a ‘‘release from propinquity’’, for
859agents still had important and stable social connections
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860 despite no longer being in frequent, intimate contact. He
861 thinks kinship systems and various other cultural institu-
862 tions emerged through this period, with their linguistic and
863 cultural prerequisites, to underwrite the stability of these
864 long-distance social links (Gamble 1998; Gamble et al.
865 2011).
866 Moreover by around 100 kya, material symbols are
867 beginning to appear in the archaeological record, and there
868 are the early signs of systematic rituals involved with the
869 burial of the dead. We do not know when human com-
870 munities developed a narrative life, but if the humans of
871 100 kya were engaging in rituals and ceremonies; if they
872 were using ochre to decorate their bodies and their pos-
873 sessions; if they were beginning to develop ceremonies and
874 norms around the disposal of the dead, then its is very
875 likely that they had developed a narrative life as well, and
876 that these narratives included stories and recollections
877 about those that have died. This seems to be a standard way
878 through which humans cope with loss, and then is some
879 ethnographic evidence that it’s a user-friendly way of
880encoding information about rare but important crises and
881opportunities (Whallon et al. 2011). The ﬁrst forms of
882referential deference, then, were likely to be intergenera-
883tional stories told by the older to the younger about those
884no longer around. In some cases these stories might be
885remarkable enough to be part of the local lore even though
886no-one still alive knew the individuals in question. Gam-
887ble’s ‘‘release from propinquity’’ probably predated the
888emergence of specialised expertise and trading cultures,
889and the economic division of labour that in turn generated a
890linguistic division of labour. So if I had to guess, quasi-
891kind terms come before names. But the division of lin-
892guistic labour probably arose through intergenerational
893difference and spatial dispersal, through narratives, and
894with name-based networks.
895I shall ﬁnish this paper with a table, which summarises
896these suggestions. It is meant as a sketch, a working
897hypothesis to organise information and ideas and no more,
898linking these stages in language evolution to dates and to
899hominin taxa in their socioecological context.
Dates and Taxa Dates and Taxa Dates and Taxa Dates and Taxa
Erectines: 1.7 mya-
800 kya
800 kya—early Heidelbergensians 400 kya—late heidelbergensians;
perhaps ‘‘archaic’’ H sapiens; early
Neanderthals
100 kya—sapiens, probably also
Neanderthals
Communicative Skills:
enhanced gesture-mime
Communicative Skills: enhanced
gesture-mime
Communicative Skills: enhanced
gesture-mime ? important shifts
to vocal communication
Communicative Skills: transition to
the vocal mode probably largely
complete
Indicative-informational
pointing; gesture-mime
in here-now
coordination; gesture in
requests, exchanges
As with erectines, plus:
gesture-mime in displaced
coordination; iconic-associative
gestures for small range of actions
and kinds—ﬁrst protowords; local
intelligence not yet required for
innovation-retention
As with early Heidelbergensians,
plus:
A large repertoire of quasi-kind
terms (probably vocal); No
referential dependence; Not much
need for proper names; local
intelligence required for
innovation-retention
Essentially modern in vocabulary
size, but still with no referential
dependence except for names;
(syntax, normative vocabulary,
indirect discourse –argued
elsewhere)
Socioecological Context Socioecological Context Socioecological Context Socioecological Context
Acheulian handaxe
technology;
Meat-eating;
Power scavenging,
opportunistic hunting,
perhaps organised
hunting;
At least some reproductive
cooperation;
Ecological cooperation, but
probably opportunistic
Late Acheulian technology;
Fire;
Organised large game hunting;
(probably meat specialists);
Reproductive cooperation;
Team-work based collective
foraging; economy based on
immediate return mutualism
As with earlier Heidelbergensians,
but with the ﬁrst signs of an
expanding stone toolkit, and of
composite technologies; economy
based on immediate return
mutualism
Developing behavioural modernity:
Expanded technological and
ecological range;
Release from proximity;
Expanding use of material symbols;
Expanding resource breadth;
economy based on reciprocation,
not immediate return mutualism
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